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Abstract
This thesis aims to analyze aggregate instability due to volatile expectations in a simple
OLG model with money. We assume there are two types of goods, necessity and luxury
goods, from which agents take utility, with the particularity of having a consumption
externality affecting the consumption of the latter. We also assume government to follow
a balanced budget rule with public spendings financed exclusively through consumption
taxation. Tax rates for each type of good may be different and may to react to the
cycle. We verify that the distinction between necessity and luxury goods is not relevant
for the emergence of indeterminacy, if there is no government intervention and if the
externality has no influence. Then we show that the fiscal policies considered may create
local indeterminacy, in the absence of externalities, if tax rates are strongly pro-cyclical
or counter-cyclical. We also show that externalities, per se, may create indeterminacy.
However, consumption taxation can, in fact, be a stabilizing instrument, by eliminating
local indeterminacy, if one of the tax rates is set pro-cyclically (counter-cyclically) for a
positive (negative) externality degree.
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1 Introduction
Whether or not Governments should adopt balanced budget rules is a wide open debate
in Europe and also in the U.S.. Many contributions are given for it, coming from politics,
ethics, law and some other areas. Economics, of course, is also a very important part of
the discussion and one of its more valuable contributions, in our opinion, is the analysis of
business cycles when such balanced budget rules are running.
It is well known that rational expectations economic models offer two types of comple-
mentary explanations for cycles. One considering exogenous shocks to the fundamentals
of the economy (Real Business Cycles approach or RBC ) and the other considering that
some endogenous fluctuations may arise, even without those shocks, through self-fulfilling
prophecies (Endogenous Business Cycles approach or EBC ). People take current decisions
relying on expectations about the future value of variables and the latter depend on agents’
current decisions. Under some economic environments, changes in expectations and cur-
rent decisions may lead to changes in future variables in the direction initially expected.
Since rational behavior requires those expectations to be right on average, though they
may be subjected to predicting errors, the result is that aggregate variables can exhibit
rational expectations stochastic bounded fluctuations around the trend, even if all the
fundamentals hold the same — that is why we call them endogenous.
Since the late 80’s lots of literature concerning endogenous cycles has been developed.
Recently, some authors have shown how empirically plausible this explanation is, at least
to explain part of the magnitude of business cycles. This particular thesis is inserted in
this branch of the study of cycles and tries to analyze, from a theoretical point of view, the
emergence of endogenous cycles and if there is a stabilizing role for government, when it
follows a balanced budget rule and public spendings are financed by consumption taxation,
with different tax rates over luxury and necessity goods.
Since the early 90’s lots of literature has come to the light on the impact of income
taxation, when no public debt is allowed, for the emergence of endogenous cycles. However,
few works were yet published on the effects of government spending financed with taxes over
consumption. Giannitsarou (2007) is one of the pioneers in this chapter, arriving to very
interesting and robust results. Within a neo-classical model with capital, infinite horizon
agents deriving utility from consumption of one unique good and leisure, constant returns
to scale technologies, perfectly competitive markets and an exogenous schedule of public
expenditures financed by a proportional tax rate over consumption, her main conclusion
is that self-fulfilling prophecies are not possible, since the labor supply is independent
from consumption tax rate. Moreover, she tested several utility functions and the previous
results show up again: though in fact indeterminacy may be allowed for some utility
formulations, it would demand empirically implausible values for the fundamentals and
so endogenous fluctuations are not likely to occur. Anyway it is clear that indeterminacy
is related with the preferences specification. Another very interesting point pinned down
by this work is that, when considered side by side with the rest of the literature that
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relates balanced budget rules and expectations-driven cycles, consumption taxation may
be preferred to income taxation, from the point of view of stability, since income taxes
affect labor supply and may induce indeterminacy, though Lloyd-Braga et all. (2008)
already show that when heterogeneity in households is introduced, consumption taxation
in deed has destabilizing effects.
Nourry et all. (October 2011) are also preparing a very complete analysis of this
topic. They go even further generalizing the results of Giannitsarou. They claim, for
instance, that, in the context of a standard Ramsey framework, “local indeterminacy is
ruled out under constant government spendings, and requires extreme conditions with
counter-cyclical government spendings” (Nourry et all., October 2011, p. 6).
There is, however, a common assumption in all these works that actually doesn’t fit
reality. Actually, according to OECD (2011) just two of the members of this community
of countries (Chile and Japan) don’t have a scheme of taxation over consumption with
multiple rates1. This multiplicity, in most of the countries, is related to some categoriza-
tion of the goods according to their degree of necessity, mainly fruit of social and equity
considerations.
In this context, our reasoning to fix a research topic was quite straightforward: if
indeterminacy has to do with preferences specification and if consumption taxation has to
do with the distinction between luxury and necessity goods (a preferences related issue),
why not to study the implications of this distinction in endogenous cycles emergence?
Arriving here, several questions came to hand concerning preferences. In fact distin-
guishing necessity and luxury goods calls for changes in the way usually used to describe
how consumers value the goods. As we know, classically this distinction relies on income
sensitivity of demand, an individual related attribute. However, we believe there is some
social component in the individual valorization of luxury goods, that results from social in-
teraction of agents and make them to value consumption of luxury goods relatively to some
reference level. And here is where the introduction of consumption externalities can be of
help. Though we tend to assume positive social networking effects prevail on consumption
of luxury goods, which is known in some literature as a keeping up with the Joneses behav-
ior (see, for example, Galí, 1994), we also analyze the other case, where those effects are
negative, which we call keeping away from the Joneses, though some literature refers also
to this case with the previously mentioned expression (see, for instance, Wendner, 2009).
The relevance of this type of externalities has been a topic of interest in several ways.
Galí (1994), for example, already studied the impact of keeping up with Joneses exter-
nalities on financial assets acquisition decisions, assuming those decisions to be a social
activity by setting up preferences depending not only on individual consumption but on
the average level of consumption in the economy. And Wendner (2009), to give another
example, also shows that this type of externalities may influence optimal income taxation,
1Whether or not these taxes are of the type Value Added Taxes or of the type Sales Taxes is not very
relevant, because. the principals of both fiscal schemes are identical, i.e. in both cases the goal is to tax
final consumption and as such, consumers are supposed to bear entirely the tax burden. What changes is
the collection mechanism, which doesn’t affect our results.
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since they affect steady state savings and growth rates.
In the context of this thesis, our aim is to study if this type of externalities has influ-
ence on local expectations-driven cycles emergence and so if there are stabilizing policies
able to smooth those effects. In fact, those policies need to be such that they eliminate
local indeterminacy, if the externality is a cause for it, as we shall see it is. Eliminating
indeterminacy will, in effect, rule out the volatility of local endogenous cycles, that appear
due volatility in agents’ expectations (Grandmont et all., 1998). Then, we will study fiscal
policies characterized by two attributes of taxes (ciclicity and rates) and define conditions
for them to be stabilizing instruments. Meanwhile, we will also see that, even in the ab-
sence of externalities, variable fiscal policies may cause indeterminacy, and so, endogenous
fluctuations, under certain conditions.
The way this work is organized is the following: in Section 2 we describe the model and
derive the equilibrium conditions, focusing specially on those who determine the perfect
foresight equilibrium dynamics of the model. In Section 3, we state the conditions for
a stationary solution and analyze the local stability properties of such a solution, if it
exists, trying to figure out the impact of government policies in the dynamics of the model
and to what extent can government have a stabilizing or destabilizing role through fiscal
policy. Then, in Section 4, we see two scenarios for fiscal policy, where one of the taxes
is constant over time or doesn’t even exist, while the other moves with the cycle, and
discuss their impact. Finally, in Section 5, we state some conclusion remarks, organizing
our main results and pointing out to some future research topics. At the very end we have
an Appendix section, where we collect all the proofs of the results we obtained.
2 The model
In this section we set up our model, which is a simple OLG (Overlapping Generations)
model, where money works as an asset to transfer value in time. We assume there are two
perfectly competitive sectors producing two types of goods and a government that raises
taxes over consumption of both goods and use them to finance public spendings, keeping
a balanced budget.
2.1 Firms
This economy has two perfectly competitive sectors: the necessity sector and the luxury
sector. In each period and in each sector, there is a continuum of identical price-takers
firms willing to maximize profits, when deciding the amount of labor they want to hire and
the output they want to offer in the market at price pct , for the necessity good, or pxt , for
the luxury good.
Furthermore, we assume the production technology in both sectors to depend linearly
on labor as a production factor.
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Assumption 1. The technology used in each production sector is described by:
yit = A
ilit, i = c, x (1)
where Ac and Ax are the productivity parameters of the necessity and of the luxury sectors,
lct is labor employed in the necessity sector and lxt has the same meaning for the luxury
sector and yct the output produced in the necessity sector and yxt the output produced in the
luxury sector.
As a result of maximizing profits in each competitive market, using the technologies in
(1), we obtain that firms should hire labor units until:
wt
pct
=Ac (2)
wt
pxt
=Ax (3)
Notice that these two results in equations (3) and (2) imply a constant ratio of con-
temporaneous prices between the two types of goods:
pxt
pct
=
Ac
Ax
(4)
2.2 Households
We consider an Overlapping Generations model (OLG) with money. In this economy each
household lives just for two periods, working while young and consuming while old. In each
period, a new generation of n identical households is born, substituting the generation who
dies.
Assumption 2. Preferences of any household born at period t is described by the following
life-time utility function:
U (ct+1, xt+1, lt) = β (ct+1 − c)α
(
xt+1χ˜
ρ
t+1
)1−α − lzt
B
(5)
In equation (5)ct+1 represents the quantity of necessity good consumed by the household
when old, xt+1 is the quantity of luxury good consumed by the household when old and lt
is the total amount of labor offered in the market by the household when young. We use
a Stone-Geary type of preferences (Geary 1953), where c represents a minimum amount of
the necessity good, below which utility becomes negative in consumption for any positive
quantity of any good. Moreover, 0 < β < 1 is a discount factor, which intends to give
relatively more value to leisure than to consumption since consumption is one period ahead
from leisure. B and \alpha are parameters such that B > 0 and 0 < α < 12.
2B is a scaling parameter that will ensure the existence of a steady state as we shall see later in Section 3
and α is related to the share of the expenditure in consumption of the necessity good in total consumption
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χ˜t+1 represents a point expectation in period t for the average amount of consumption
of the luxury good in the economy in t+ 1 (χt+1 ≡ Xt+1/n =
∑n
i=1 x
i
t+1/n = xt+1), which
is taken as given by families when deciding about their private consumption levels, due
to their atomistic size. This aims to take in account that consumption of luxury good
has some social effect. It is easy to see that this effect crucially depends on the signal of
parameter ρ. If ρ > 0 the representative household is considered to give more value to an
extra unity of luxury goods when the average level of consumption of those goods in the
economy is higher, as if there was a positive social networking effect in the consumption
of those goods. This type of externality is known in the literature as keeping up with the
Joneses (see, for example, Galí 1994), and, in simple terms, it’s like agents in this economy
value more to have an iPad when everybody around has one. However, if ρ < 0 the effect
is exactly the opposite: the more the luxury good is consumed on average, the less each
agent values its consumption. Again, in simple terms, it’s like agents in this economy
value more to have a Rembrandt painting when nobody around has one. Here we must say
that literature is a little bit confusing, because some authors (see, for instance, Wendner
2009) also refer to this case as keeping up with the Joneses. But, in fact, assuming a
strictly negative ρ means that agents’ marginal utility is decreasing with the average level
of luxury consumption. Thus, keeping away from the Joneses would probably be a better
description for this particular sort of externality.
It seems both considerations are empirically plausible. Nevertheless, and even if we
discuss both cases in our analysis, we tend to assume a strictly positive ρ. For this reason,
a statement must be done on our definition of luxury good.
First of all, it is important to remember the standard definition of luxury goods in
economics.
Definition 1. A good x is considered to be luxury if its demand has high sensitiveness
to changes in consumer’s income m, i.e., if its income elasticity of marshallian demand,
defined as:
η ≡ ∂x
∂m
m
x
is higher than unity (η > 1), which means that the percentage change in the quantity
consumed of x is proportionally higher than the percentage change observed in income.
Similarly, a good x is considered to be a necessity good if 0 < η < 1 and an inferior good
if η < 0.
Applying the previous definition in the context of our model, with Stone-Geary pref-
erences defined over two goods, the following Proposition is straightforward:
Proposition 1. For any c > 0, x is a luxury good and c is a necessity good, under
expenditures.
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Definition 1, since income elasticities of demand of x and c, are such that:
ηct+1 ≡
lt+1
lt+1 +
1−α
α
(1+τct+1)c
Ac
< 1
ηxt+1 ≡
lt+1
lt+1 − (1+τ
c
t+1)c
Ac
> 1
Proof. See appendix D.
So, luxury, before being an hypothesis about social interaction of agents, it is an in-
dividual attribute implicit in preferences, that characterizes sensitiveness to income. For
this reason, when we call x a luxury good, this is not properly an assumption, but a re-
sult. Here, luxury is defined relatively, as opposed to necessity, and states for the good
that agents don’t require a survival consumption in order to draw utility from, which has
the natural consequence of having an income elasticity of demand higher than one. And
this fact is independent from the externality (it is not the externality what causes x to be
luxury) and from the social effect we want to consider through it.
But even under this clarification, a couple of questions remain: what is, then, the social
effect we want to model with ρ > 0? Is it observable? Though we actually don’t have
empirical evidence on it, what we want to describe with the introduction of a keeping up
with the Joneses effect over the non-necessity good (possibly, the best tag) is that agents
don’t seek for exclusivity when they consume it, but for living standards updating. They
don’t suffer from cupidity, but from envy.
This idea has also some support in the occidental thought for almost three centuries.
Kierkegaard (1978), a danish philosopher from the late eighteen century already stated
how the life of societies is organized upon envy, as a consequence of rationalism:
“(...) envy becomes the negatively unifying principle in a passionless and
very reflective age [as the one emerged after the French Revolution]. This must
not promptly be interpreted ethically, as an accusation; no, reflection’s idea, if
it may be called that, is envy (...). Envy in the process of establishing itself
takes the form of leveling.”
Of course here is not the place to develop a debate on to what extent Kierkegaard was or
not right, but it illustrates how reasonable is our assumption of social leveling instead of
outstanding.
Moreover, notice that when consumption is driven by a social status highlighting desire,
consumers increase expenses on luxury goods by choosing more and more rare (and so,
expensive) luxury goods. Rich people (or, better, consumers of luxury goods) don’t run
away from iPads to buy apples, when iPad gets widely used; if they really want to underline
their social condition, they possibly run away from iPads to Rembrandt paintings (another
and more expensive luxury good). In the context of our model, since there is a single
luxury good, the way to increase expenditures in luxury goods is increasing the quantity
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consumed of it. This to say that even if we were to assume cupidity instead of envy in
consumption of the luxury good, a positive ρ would work fine, in the context of our model3.
Finally, the labor offered by households, as we saw before, will be used by firms of the
necessity and of the luxury sectors. For that amount of labor offered, the household gets
paid a nominal wage wt, equal across sectors, since the labor market is assumed to be
perfectly competitive and to allow for perfect mobility of workers. In each period t, the
labor income can be saved through a stock of money (the unique asset in this economy to
transfer value through time), which will be available to spend in consumption in period
t + 1 and, therefore, we denote by mt+1. So, on top of a budget constraint there is also a
sort of liquidity constraint that affects our household’s decision.
Assumption 3. When maximizing its utility, each household faces the following con-
straints:
wtlt = mt+1 (6)
mt+1 = p˜
c
t+1
(
1 + τ˜ ct+1
)
ct+1 + p˜
x
t+1
(
1 + τ˜xt+1
)
xt+1 (7)
where p˜ct+1 and p˜
x
t+1 are point expectations in t for the prices of each good in t+1, and τ˜
c
t+1
and τ˜xt+1 are also point expectations in t for the value of tax rates in period t + 1, which
were not yet announced by government.
This way, under Assumptions 2 and 3, a household born in t will maximize its life-time
utility, described by equation (5), setting the labor supply in t and demand for both goods
in t+ 1 according to the following first order conditions:
xt+1 = (1− α)
wtlt − p˜ct+1
(
1 + τ˜ ct+1
)
c
p˜xt+1
(
1 + τ˜xt+1
) (8)
ct+1 = α
wtlt
p˜ct+1
(
1 + τ˜ ct+1
) + (1− α) c (9)
lt =
[
Bαβ
wt
p˜ct+1
(
1 + τ˜ ct+1
) (ct+1 − c)α−1 (xt+1χ˜ρt+1)1−α
] 1
z−1
(10)
Notice that equation (10), which represents the total labor supply of households in period t,
depends on expectations for future prices, taxes and average level of luxury consumption.
For future reference, we must also add two more details that emerge from the previous
results. The first is that, taking as given the externality and the tax rates, the private
3Notice that considering several luxury goods would require much more heavy assumptions on the model.
It will not only change the shape of preferences, but, perhaps, it would also require other assumptions on
the way the luxury production sector works (for example, monopolistic competition).
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indirect utility of consumption4:
v = β
[
α
(
1 + τ˜xt+1
)
p˜xt+1(
1 + τ˜ ct+1
)
p˜ct+1
]α
(1− α)(1−α) wtlt −
(
1 + τ˜ ct+1
)
p˜ct+1c
p˜xt+1
(
1 + τ˜xt+1
) (11)
is linear in income. And the second is that the private elasticity of labor supply with
respect to wage is given by 1z−1 .
2.3 Government
In this economy, government follows a balanced budget rule, avoiding public debt and
money issuing. This way, public spendings are given by revenues collected by issuing taxes
on consumption, at a tax rate τ ct for the necessity good and at a tax rate τxt for the luxury
good. The tax rates are supposed to react to cycle according to the following Assumption.
Assumption 4. Tax rates over consumption of each type of good are determined by the
following policy rules:
τ ct ≡θc
(
lt
l
)ϕc
(12)
τxt ≡θx
(
lt
l
)ϕx
(13)
where θc > 0 and θx > 0 are the steady state tax rates, lt/l is a ratio that measures
deviations of labor supply from its steady state value, here used as a proxy for measuring the
cycle, and ϕc and ϕx are parameters that impose each tax rate to be pro-cyclical (counter-
cyclical), if strictly positive (negative).
The interpretation of parameters θi and ϕi, i = x, c, is similar to that consider in
Lloyd-Braga et all. (2008). It is clear, this way, that if ϕi = 0 then the tax rate τ i is
constant.
We also assume that public spendings are lost, as if they were wasted resources in the
economy: neither useful, nor productive. They are also not transferred to households,
which could, in fact, be an option. But we preferred not to assume them this way, as if
the State is paying back a huge stock of debt accumulated in past periods, like Portugal
right now. A careful reader would also notice that we don’t establish any assumption on
what goods government spends fiscal revenue, assuming only that public spendings adjust
endogenously to the revenue collected, since a balanced budget rule is followed. This is
possible because, as we shall see later, the way government uses fiscal revenues has no
impact in the dynamics of the model with respect to the aggregate level of employment.
4Since we have additive separable preferences, this equation is simple obtained isolating the consumption
counter-part of equation (5) and plugging in it the marshallian demands for c and x in equations (2) and
(3) respectively.
8
2.4 Equilibrium and Dynamics
In this subsection we obtain the intertemporal perfect foresight equilibrium dynamics,
which is an equilibrium path for variables such that households don’t incur in predicting
errors. This is a particular case of rational expectations: households correctly anticipate in
period t future values for the variables in t+1, such that, formally, p˜it+1 = pit+1, τ˜ it+1 = τ it+1,
for i = c, x, and χ˜t+1 = xt+1. Thus, as the future values of variables depend on present
decisions and these, by their turn, depend on expected values for variables, these expected
values can become confirmed in future, originating self-fulfilling prophecies phenomena.
As we saw before, in our model, the dynamics are particularly dependent on the labor
supply, because current decisions on labor supply depend on expectations for future values
of some variables. Using the market clearing condition for the money market, M = mt ⇒
wtlt = wt+1lt+1, where M > 0 is an exogenous constant money supply, and after some
simple substitutions, we can conclude that those dynamics can be summarized in a single
equation as stated in the next Proposition.
Proposition 2. Any intertemporal perfect foresight equilibrium for variable l obeys to the
following motion equation:
βαα (1− α)(1+ρ)(1−α)
(
Ax
1 + τxt+1
)(1+ρ)(1−α)
×
×
[
lt+1 −
1 + τ ct+1
Ac
c
]ρ(1−α)
lt+1
(
Ac
1 + τ ct+1
)α
= z
lzt
B
(14)
Proof. See appendix C.
It is remarkable that the dynamics of the model can be written exclusively in terms
of total labor supply5. It is also of notice that equation (14) defines a one dimensional
dynamic system in labor l. This variable is non predetermined since its current value
depends on expectations for the future.
3 Steady State and Local Dynamics
Once we already described the conditions which determine the the perfect foresight dy-
namic behavior of the model, we focus now our attention in a stationary solution, if it
exists, since we are interested in analyzing the emergence of local expectations-driven cy-
cles. These type of fluctuations are exclusively caused by volatility in agents’ expectations
and they occur in a neighborhood of the stationary solution for the equilibrium system.
This will be the case as far as local indeterminacy characterizes that stationary solution of
the deterministic counter-part of the model (See Grandmont et all., 1998).
5Since relative prices are constant, the total output in each sector and the amount of labor affected to
each sector will be entirely determined by the demand side, for which will be crucial to know the path for
public consumption of both necessity and luxury goods.
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3.1 Steady State
Since we are interested in the emergence of local expectations-driven cycles, we will analyze
the local dynamics close to a stationary solution, i.e. an equilibrium path for the variables
such that lt+1 = lt = l, implying τ ct = θc, τxt = θx. Hence, we need to establish conditions
ensuring the existence of such a steady state l. Using equations (5), (9), (8) and (10) it is
straightforward to obtain the following Proposition.
Proposition 3. Any l > 1+θ
c
Ac c ⇔ lw > pc (1 + θc) c is a steady state of (14) if and only
if B is a unique solution of:
B =
zlz−1
βαα (1− α)(1+ρ)(1−α)
(
Ax
1+θx
)(1+ρ)(1−α) (
Ac
1+θc
)α [
l − 1+θcAc c
]ρ(1−α)
And this can always be the case, because B is a “free” scaling parameter, whose intro-
duction is a standard procedure in related literature (see, for example, Cazzavillan et all.
1998 and Nourry et all. 2011).
In our local dynamic analysis we will assume that the steady state l is constant. Propo-
sition 3 allows for keeping the steady state the same, once we change any of the exogenous
parameters, as long as B adjusts. Note that, in any case B doesn’t depend on parameters
ϕc and ϕx, which means we can analyze changes in these parameters without affecting or
adjusting the value of B, and also without affecting the underlying steady state.
3.2 Local Dynamics Analysis
Because we are just interested in studying the stability around some steady state, we
can limit our study to the local dynamics of the system around it, using a Taylor linear
approximation. If a steady state exists, which we already proved, we can analyze if equi-
librium paths deviated from it in a small arbitrary neighborhood would converge or, on
the contrary, become explosive.
Proposition 4. Let lˆt+1 and lˆt represent percentage deviations from the steady state in
two consecutive periods and ηx be the income elasticity of demand for the luxury good as
defined in Proposition 1. Then, the log-linearized equilibrium dynamics for lˆ is given by:
lˆt+1 =λlˆt, (15)
λ ≡ z
1 + ρ (1− α)
[
ηx − ϕx θx1+θx 1+ρρ + ϕc θ
c
1+θc
(
1− ηx − αρ(1−α)
)] (16)
Proof. See appendix E.
Notice that λ represents a single eigenvalue because our equilibrium dynamics are
characterized by a single equation.
What this relationship tells us is that, in an arbitrary small neighborhood of the steady
state, there can be equilibrium paths for labor supply starting with a slightly different
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value from the stationary solution (since labor supply is not a predetermined variable and
depends on future expectations subjected to predicting errors) that would soon converge
to it. This will happen as far as the system is locally indeterminate around that specific
stationary solution, according to the following Definition.
Definition 2. The dynamic system in equation (14) will be locally indeterminate in an
arbitrary small neighborhood of any solution l that verifies Proposition 3 for a given B,
if and only if the absolute value of the eigenvalue of the system in (16), evaluated at the
steady state, is small than unity, i.e., if and only if |λ| < 1.
Given this definition, analyzing the expression of λ as defined in (16) allows us to infer
some immediate reasonings.
First, since the fiscal policy parameters only influence λ through ϕi θi
1+θi
, i = x, c, we
see that if government establishes constant tax rates, setting ϕi = 0, it will not be able
to influence the local dynamics of the model. The idea that it is the variability of the tax
rate that is relevant for local dynamic properties was already emphasized in Lloyd-Braga
et all. (2008).
Second, when government is absent, with θc = θx = 0, or when a fiscal policy with
constant tax rates is followed, with ϕc = ϕx = 0, whether there is local indeterminacy or not
crucially depends on the existence of the externality. Indeed, in such a case, in the absence
of externalities (ρ = 0) we obtain that λ = z > 1, and so any deviation from the steady
state value would have an underlying linear explosive path for labor supply, i.e., there is no
indeterminacy and no bounded expectations-driven fluctuations close to the steady state
would exist. In the absence of externalities and government intervention, the log-linearized
system is equivalent to the case where there is only one aggregate consumption good Y ,
with U (Yt+1, lt) = βYt+1 − l
z
t
B , Y being produced out of labor according to Yt+1 = lt+1.
This equivalence is due to the linearity of consumption’s utility in income in both situations
(recall equation (11) in subsection 2.2). In case of a unique good, indeterminacy requires a
negatively sloped labor supply, so indeterminacy cannot occur with 1/z − 1 > 0⇔ z > 1.
Due to the equivalence referred, the same happens in our case in absence of externalities
and government intervention. The introduction of consumption externalities breaks the
linear relation between consumption utility and income and, as shown below in the next
subsection, it may allow the occurrence of indeterminacy.
Third, the expression in (16) also tells us that, when ϕi θi
1+θi
= 0, for i = x, c (with
θc = θx = 0 or ϕc = ϕx = 0) , if an externality of the type ρ > 0, that we tend to
consider is in place, then the distinction between necessity and luxury goods may become
relevant for the emergence of endogenous cycles: the income elasticity of demand of the
good over whose the externality relies on, empowers the destabilizing effect the externality
may have. This leads us to another important reasoning: for the same (perhaps low)
degree of influence of the externality, social networking effects (ρ > 0) are more likely to be
destabilizing the higher the income elasticity of demand of the good which the externality
affects. Anyway, it is also remarkable that the indeterminacy that may arise because of the
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externality can be ruled out by government, through a cycle-indexed fiscal policy, whose
effectiveness we analyze in more detail in next section.
Fourth, it comes also from the expression above that a variable (cycle-indexed) fiscal
policy is, by itself and in the absence of the externality, a source of indeterminacy. Con-
sidering separately the case of a variable tax rate on luxury good from a variable tax rate
on the necessity good, we have the following two Propositions.
Proposition 5. In the absence of externality (ρ = 0), but in the presence of a fiscal
policy involving only a variable tax rate on luxury goods as in (13) of Assumption 4, i.e.,
considering θc = 0 or ϕc = 0, local indeterminacy will emerge if and only if ϕx θ
x
1+θx >
1+z
1−α > 0, i.e., a sufficiently strong pro-cyclical tax rate on luxury goods, or if ϕ
x θx
1+θx <
1−z
1−α < 0, i.e., a sufficiently strong counter-cyclical tax rate.
Proof. See appendix G.
Proposition 6. In the absence of externality (ρ = 0), but in the presence of a fiscal
policy involving only a variable tax rate on necessity goods as in (12) of Assumption 4, i.e.,
considering θx = 0 or ϕx = 0, local indeterminacy will emerge if and only if ϕc θ
c
1+θc >
1+z
α > 0, i.e., a sufficiently strong pro-cyclical tax rate on luxury goods, or if ϕ
c θc
1+θc <
1−z
α < 0, i.e., a sufficiently strong counter-cyclical tax rate.
Proof. See appendix G.
We can conclude from the previous Propositions that when one of the taxes holds
invariant with cycle, indeterminacy will emerge if the other is sufficiently pro-cyclical or
sufficiently counter-cyclical.
Here additive separable preferences between consumption and labor (or leisure) are
considered. Giannitsarou (2007), using a one sector Ramsey model with capital and no
externalities, and considering additive separable preferences in consumption and leisure,
found that, if government keeps the budget balanced and uses proportional consumption
taxation to finance a constant flow of government spendings, indeterminacy cannot occur.
This result is also referred in Nourry et all. (October 2011) to be obtained at least for
additively separable preferences. In contrast to their results, we have seen that, even
with additively separable preferences as considered in (5) and no externalities, within an
Overlapping Generations model with money as the unique asset, indeterminacy is possible,
provided consumption taxes are sufficiently pro-cyclical or counter-cyclical. This might be
due to the fact that, under our policy rule, government spending is not constant.
3.3 Indeterminacy in the Absence of Government
Our main aim is to characterize the ciclicity of the tax rates that are able to eliminate
indeterminacy caused by consumption externalities. Therefore we establish conditions
on the degree of externalities ρ under which indeterminacy prevails in the absence of
government intervention, or if tax rates are constant. In the Appendix we prove the
following Proposition.
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Proposition 7. If government policy is absent, i.e., θc = θx = 0, or characterized by a
constant tax rate over time, i.e., ϕc = ϕx = 0, the eigenvalue in equation (16) will take the
form:
λ =
z
1 + ρ (1− α) ηx
In such a case there is indeterminacy if and only if, either:
ρ >
z − 1
ηx (1− α) > 0, so that λ ∈ (0, 1)
or:
ρ < − z + 1
ηx (1− α) < 0, so that λ ∈ (−1, 0)
Proof. See appendix F.
So, this Proposition tells us is that, in the absence of variable tax rates, a sufficiently
strong influence of the externality, i.e., a |ρ| high enough, may indeed cause indeterminacy.
4 Stabilizing Fiscal Policies Analysis
In this section we analyze two types of stabilizing fiscal policies, considering separately
the case of a variable tax rate on luxury goods and then the case of a tax rate on the
necessity good. The aim of our study will be to define conditions on policy factors ϕi θ
i
1+θi
,
for i = c x, such that the indeterminacy, that would emerge in the absence of government,
is eliminated.
4.1 Variable Tax Rate in the Luxury Good
We will start our study about government policies by the case where it sets a constant tax
rate on necessity goods, i.e., ϕc = 0, but a variable tax rate on luxury goods according to
(13), with ϕx 6= 0. Using (16) it is easy to see that the eigenvalue becomes:
λ = λx ≡ z
1 + ρ (1− α)
[
ηx − ϕx θx1+θx 1+ρρ
]
Following the mission intended for the present section, the next Proposition states
conditions on policy parameter ϕx θ
x
1+θx such that indeterminacy is ruled out, with |λx| > 1.
Proposition 8. Under variable tax rates on luxury goods, and considering ρ > −1, inde-
terminacy is ruled out if and only if :
ρ (1− α) ηx + 1− z
(1− α) (1 + ρ) < ϕ
x θ
x
1 + θx
<
ρ (1− α) ηx + 1 + z
(1− α) (1 + ρ) ,
θx
1 + θx
ϕx 6= (1− α) ρη
x + 1
(1− α) (1 + ρ)
Proof. See appendix H.1.
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Using Proposition 7 we see that when indeterminacy emerges, in the absence of gov-
ernment intervention, with a positive externality degree, then ρ (1− α) ηx + 1 − z > 0.
Therefore using also Proposition 8 we have the following result:
Corollary 1. If ρ > 0 and if indeterminacy prevails in the absence of government, i.e.
values of ρ > z−1ηx(1−α) > 0, then only a pro-cyclical tax rate, with ϕ
x θx
1+θx >
ρ(1−α)ηx+1−z
(1−α)(1+ρ) >
0, is able to eliminate indeterminacy.
Thus, a pro-cyclical tax rate is required for stabilizing purposes when externalities
of the type keeping up with the Joneses are sufficiently strong. Notice that the boundary
defined this way allows government to achieve the same fiscal result combining a low steady
state level for the tax rate, but highly pro-cyclical or, otherwise, a high steady state tax
rate over luxury goods, but less reactive to cycle, in order to achieve the same stabilizing
goal.
However, if a keeping away from the Joneses behavior was to be assumed, the con-
clusion is exactly the opposite, since indeterminacy emerges in the absence of government
intervention when ρ (1− α) ηx + 1 + z < 0.
Corollary 2. If ρ < 0 and if indeterminacy prevails in the absence of government, i.e. for
values of ρ such that −1 < ρ < − z+1ηx(1−α) < 0, indeterminacy cannot be ruled out unless
government sets a counter-cyclical tax rate such that ϕx θ
x
1+θx <
ρ(1−α)ηx+1+z
(1−α)(1+ρ) < 0.
4.2 Variable Tax Rate in the Necessity Good
This case is a little bit more complex. Now we pay attention to a fiscal policy characterized
by having a constant tax rate on luxury goods, which means ϕx = 0, and a cycle-indexed
tax rate in necessity goods, such that ϕc 6= 0 in (12). This way, the eigenvalue in (16)
around the steady state becomes:
λ = λc ≡ z
1 + ρ (1− α)
[
ηx + ϕc θ
c
1+θc
(
1− ηxss − αρ(1−α)
)]
Again we need to find the boundaries for government policy factor ϕc θ
c
1+θc between
which it will be a useful instrument for eliminating the indeterminacy that may arise in
the absence of government intervention. And, again, those boundaries will be different
according to the signal of ρ. So, the following Proposition states conditions on ϕc θ
c
1+θc
such that |λc| > 1 and indeterminacy is ruled out.
Proposition 9. Under variable tax rates on necessity goods, and considering ρ > − α(ηx−1)(1−α) ,
indeterminacy is ruled out if and only if :
ρ (1− α) ηx + 1− z
ρ (1− α) (ηx − 1) + α < ϕ
c θ
c
1 + θc
<
ρ (1− α) ηx + 1 + z
ρ (1− α) (ηx − 1) + α, ϕ
c θ
c
1 + θc
6= ρ (1− α) η
x + 1
ρ (1− α) (ηx − 1) + α
Proof. See appendix H.2.
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Using Proposition 7 we see that when indeterminacy emerges, in the absence of gov-
ernment intervention, with a positive externality degree, then ρ (1− α) ηx + 1 − z > 0.
Therefore, from Proposition 9 above, we can derive the following Corollary:
Corollary 3. If ρ > 0 and if indeterminacy prevails in the absence of government, i.e. for
values of ρ > z−1ηx(1−α) > 0, then only a pro-cyclical tax rate with ϕ
c θc
1+θc >
ρ(1−α)ηx+1−z
(1−α)(1+ρ) > 0
is able to eliminate indeterminacy.
Hence, we arrived to a similar conclusion to the one we obtained for luxury goods in
Corollary 1: a pro-cyclical tax rate is required for stabilizing purposes when externalities of
the type keeping up with the Joneses are sufficiently strong. It remains also true as before
that the same stabilization result can be achieved by government combining a low steady
state level for the tax rate, but highly pro-cyclical, or, reversely, a high steady state tax
rate, but less reactive to cycle.
Also as previously, if a keeping away from the Joneses behavior is in place, the conclu-
sion on the ciclicity of the fiscal policy is exactly the opposite, since indeterminacy emerges
in the absence of government intervention when ρ (1− α) ηxss + 1 + z < 0. In fact, from
Propositions 9 and 7 the following result is clear.
Corollary 4. If ρ < 0 and if indeterminacy prevails in the absence of government, i.e. for
values of ρ such that − α(ηx−1)(1−α) < ρ < − z+1ηx(1−α) < 0, indeterminacy cannot be ruled out
unless government sets a counter-cyclical tax rate such that ϕc θ
c
1+θc <
ρ(1−α)ηx+1+z
(1−α)(1+ρ) < 0.
From these Propositions we can conclude that, if indeterminacy is caused by luxury
consumption externalities (ρ 6= 0), then a cycle-indexed tax rate over one of the goods
is suitable to eliminate indeterminacy, no matter whether this ciclicity exists on the tax
rate over luxury goods or over necessity goods: given a positive value of ρ > z−1ηx(1−α) >
0, the tax rate should be pro-cyclical, whereas given a negative value for ρ, such that
max
{
−1,− α(ηx−1)(1−α)
}
< ρ < − z+1ηx(1−α) < 0, the tax rate should be counter-cyclical.
Thus, if instability do arise in the absence of government, which will be the case if a
sufficiently strong degree of externalities exists, then it is possible to correct those fluctu-
ations with cycle-indexed fiscal policies. If the externality is positive, in a boom people
will over react consuming more luxury goods, in order to keep up with the Joneses. In
such a case, a pro-cyclical tax rate will cause an increase in prices, making people consume
less and, this way, the effect of the externality becomes smoothed. On the contrary, if the
externality is negative, in a boom people will react avoiding consumption of luxury goods,
in order to run away from the Joneses. Hence, a counter-cyclical tax rate may correct
expectations on prices in a way that attenuates the effect of the externality.
5 Concluding Remarks
This thesis discusses the impact of consumption externalities on luxury goods in the emer-
gence of local expectations-driven cycles, when government is committed with a balanced
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budget rule and public spendings are financed exclusively through consumption taxation,
with different tax rates for each type of good. We confirmed a well known result in the
literature: externalities are, indeed, a source of indeterminacy. In our case, this happens
because the marginal utility, and, thus, demand, of luxury goods depends on the contem-
poraneous average level of consumption of those goods in the economy. However, since
labor supply is one period lagged in the OLG model, and because households want to
level their luxury consumption by the one of their peers, the labor supply decision will
be influenced by expectations on the average level of consumption of those goods in the
future. And these expectations, which are volatile by nature, even if they are rational as
we assume they are, may lead to bounded fluctuations on labor supply around a stationary
value and induce aggregate instability. Moreover, when a positive externality is considered,
and so social networking effects are assumed to affect consumption of luxury goods, this
effect is amplified by income-elasticity of demand for those goods, i.e., indeterminacy is
more likely to occur, for high levels of sensitiveness of demand to income. This is because
labor is the unique income resource of households and so, the more reactive the demand
of luxury goods is to income, the less is the change needed in labor supply to keep up with
the Joneses, according to expectations of households for the average level of consumption
of those goods.
We also verified that neither the distinction between luxury and necessity goods itself
nor their different taxation is relevant for generating indeterminacy, in the absence of ex-
ternalities and government intervention. In fact, since the Stone-Geary preferences we use
are quasi-homothetic, their related indirect utility function is linear in income, sharing this
feature with linear homogenous preferences. Thereby, it is equivalent to one sector Over-
lapping Generations model with money and, as well known in the literature, indeterminacy
can not occur, unless labor supply has a negative slope, which is not our departing point,
since we assume elasticity of labor supply to be positive with respect to wage. However, the
introduction of consumption externalities removes aggregate utility linearity in income and
indeterminacy may indeed show up, even in the absence of externalities and government
intervention.
Furthermore, though our work is not directly comparable with the work developed by
Giannitsarou (2007) and Nourry et all. (October 2011) since they used a standard Ramsey
framework, we arrived to a different conclusion from them, with respect to additive sepa-
rable preferences, as the ones we used. Actually, in the context of our simple two-sectors
OLG model with money, consumption taxation, right without the presence of consumption
externalities, may have destabilizing effects, as far as sufficiently pro-cyclical or counter-
cyclical tax rates are adopted. This may happen because, on the contrary of these authors,
that consider constant public spendings, we assume public spendings to adjust to the tax
revenues collected. Nevertheless, it would be interesting to analyze this topic in more detail
in a future work.
Another interesting conclusion arising from our work is that, in line with what we
expected, whatever the rate government chooses to move with cycle, i.e. be it the one over
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necessity goods or the other over luxury goods, it must set them pro-cyclical, if a positive
externality is assumed (keeping up with the Joneses), and counter-cyclical, if a negative
externality is considered (keeping away from the Joneses). However, this conclusion seems
not to be that straightforward when both taxes are variable, though we didn’t analyze that
case.
Finally, we think there are many other topics for future research departing from here,
that we didn’t have time to cover. Two that we already have thought about was the
analysis of other types of fiscal policies. For instance, it would be of value to see a scenario
where government uses one of the tax rates to keep a balance budget with exogenous
public spendings, and the other one to stabilize expectations-driven fluctuations. On top
of that, a welfare analysis, considering the fiscal policies presented in this work, would
also be interesting to develop. Lastly, it would also be interesting to consider different
technologies and market structures from the ones we assumed to derive our results.
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A Solution for Household Utility Maximization Problem
The original problem:
max
ct+1, xt+1, lt
β (ct+1 − c)α (xt+1χρ)1−α − l
z
t
B
s.t. wtlt = mt+1
mt+1 = p
c
t+1
(
1 + τ ct+1
)
ct+1 + p
x
t+1
(
1 + τxt+1
)
xt+1
c0 andx0 given
Using the restrictions to substitute ct+1 is equivalent to:
max
xt+1, lt
β
(
wt
pct+1
(
1 + τ ct+1
) lt − pxt+1 (1 + τxt+1)
pct+1
(
1 + τ ct+1
)xt+1 − c)α (xt+1χρ)1−α − lzt
B
Taking First Order Conditions:
∂
∂xt+1
= 0⇔− αp
x
t+1
(
1 + τxt+1
)
pct+1
(
1 + τ ct+1
)β( wt
pct+1
(
1 + τ ct+1
) lt − pxt+1 (1 + τxt+1)
pct+1
(
1 + τ ct+1
)xt+1 − c)α−1
× (xt+1χρ)1−α + (1− α)χρ
× β
(
wt
pct+1
(
1 + τ ct+1
) lt − pxt+1 (1 + τxt+1)
pct+1
(
1 + τ ct+1
)xt+1 − c)α
× (xt+1χρ)−α = 0
⇔αp
x
t+1
(
1 + τxt+1
)
pct+1
(
1 + τ ct+1
)β( wt
pct+1
(
1 + τ ct+1
) lt − pxt+1 (1 + τxt+1)
pct+1
(
1 + τ ct+1
)xt+1 − c)α−1
× (xt+1χρ)1−α = (1− α)χρ
× β
(
wt
pct+1
(
1 + τ ct+1
) lt − pxt+1 (1 + τxt+1)
pct+1
(
1 + τ ct+1
)xt+1 − c)α
× (xt+1χρ)−α
⇔ α
1− α
pxt+1
(
1 + τxt+1
)
pct+1
(
1 + τ ct+1
)xt+1 = wt
pct+1
(
1 + τ ct+1
) lt − pxt+1 (1 + τxt+1)
pct+1
(
1 + τ ct+1
)xt+1 − c
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∂∂xt+1
⇔ α
1− αxt+1 =
wt
pxt+1
(
1 + τxt+1
) lt − xt+1 − pct+1 (1 + τ ct+1)
pxt+1
(
1 + τxt+1
)c
⇔α+ 1− α
1− α xt+1 =
wtlt
pxt+1
(
1 + τxt+1
) − pct+1 (1 + τ ct+1) c
pxt+1
(
1 + τxt+1
)
⇔xt+1 = 1− α
pxt+1
(
1 + τxt+1
) [wtlt − pct+1 (1 + τ ct+1) c]
Recalling ct+1:
ct+1 =
wt
pct+1
(
1 + τ ct+1
) lt − pxt+1 (1 + τxt+1)
pct+1
(
1 + τ ct+1
)xt+1 ⇔
ct+1 =
wt
pct+1
(
1 + τ ct+1
) lt − pxt+1 (1 + τxt+1)
pct+1
(
1 + τ ct+1
) 1− α
pxt+1
(
1 + τxt+1
) [wtlt − pct+1 (1 + τ ct+1) c]⇔
ct+1 =
α
pct+1
(
1 + τ ct+1
)wtlt + (1− α) c
∂
∂lt
= 0⇔α wt
pct+1
(
1 + τ ct+1
)β( wt
pct+1
(
1 + τ ct+1
) lt − pxt+1 (1 + τxt+1)
pct+1
(
1 + τ ct+1
)xt+1 − c)α−1
× (xt+1χρ)1−α − z l
z−1
t
B
= 0
⇔α wt
pct+1
(
1 + τ ct+1
)β( wt
pct+1
(
1 + τ ct+1
) lt−
−p
x
t+1
(
1 + τxt+1
)
pct+1
(
1 + τ ct+1
) 1− α
pxt+1
(
1 + τxt+1
) [wtlt − pct+1 (1 + τ ct+1) c]− c
)α−1
×
(
1− α
pxt+1
(
1 + τxt+1
) [wtlt − pct+1 (1 + τ ct+1) c]χρ
)1−α
= z
lz−1t
B
⇔βααα−1χρ(1−α) (1− α)1−α wt
pct+1
(
1 + τ ct+1
) ( wtlt
pct+1
(
1 + τ ct+1
) − c)α−1
×
(
wtlt
pxt+1
(
1 + τxt+1
) − pct+1 (1 + τ ct+1)
pxt+1
(
1 + τxt+1
)c)1−α = z lz−1t
B
⇔βααχρ(1−α) (1− α)1−α wt
pct+1
(
1 + τ ct+1
) ( wtlt
pct+1
(
1 + τ ct+1
) − c)α−1
×
(
wtlt
pxt+1
(
1 + τxt+1
) − pct+1 (1 + τ ct+1)
pxt+1
(
1 + τxt+1
)c)1−α = z lz−1t
B
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B Solution for Firms Problem
max
lit
Πit = p
i
tA
ilit − wtlit
Taking FOC:
∂Πit
∂lit
= 0⇔pitAi − wt = 0
⇔wt
pit
= Ai
C Dynamics Simplification
Assuming a stationary exogenous money supply denoted by M , such that M > 0, the
market clearing condition for the money market requires:
M =mt = mt+1 ⇒
wtlt =wt+1lt+1
Combining equations (6), (2) and (3) we know that:
mt =mt+1 ⇔
wtlt =wt+1lt+1 ⇔
wtlt =
wt+1
pct+1
pct+1lt+1 ⇔
wt
pct+1
lt =A
clt+1
wt
pxt+1
lt =A
xlt+1
This way, we can re-write equation (10) as:
βααχρ(1−α) (1− α)1−α wt
pct+1
(
1 + τ ct+1
) ( wtlt
pct+1
(
1 + τ ct+1
) − c)α−1×
×
(
wtlt
pxt+1
(
1 + τxt+1
) − pct+1 (1 + τ ct+1)
pxt+1
(
1 + τxt+1
)c)1−α = z lz−1t
B
⇔
βααχρ(1−α) (1− α)1−α A
clt+1
lt
(
1 + τ ct+1
) ( Aclt+1
1 + τ ct+1
− c
)α−1
×
×
(
Axlt+1
1 + τxt+1
− A
x
(
1 + τ ct+1
)
Ac
(
1 + τxt+1
) c)1−α = z lz−1t
B
⇔
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βααχρ(1−α) (1− α)1−α A
clt+1(
1 + τ ct+1
) ( Ac
1 + τ ct+1
)α−1(
lt+1 −
1 + τ ct+1
Ac
c
)α−1
×
×
(
Ax
1 + τxt+1
)1−α(
lt+1 −
1 + τ ct+1
Ac
c
)1−α
= z
lz−1t lt
B
⇔
βααχρ(1−α) (1− α)1−α lt+1
(
Ac
1 + τ ct+1
)α( Ax
1 + τxt+1
)1−α
= z
lzt
B
Since in the general equilibrium χ = xt+1, using equation (8) we get:
xt+1 =
1− α
pxt+1
(
1 + τxt+1
) [wtlt − pct+1 (1 + τ ct+1) c]⇔
xt+1 =
1− α
1 + τxt+1
[
wtlt
pxt+1
− p
c
t+1
pxt+1
(
1 + τ ct+1
)
c
]
⇔
xt+1 =
1− α
1 + τxt+1
[
Axlt+1 − A
x
Ac
(
1 + τ ct+1
)
c
]
⇔
xt+1 =
(1− α)Ax
1 + τxt+1
[
lt+1 −
1 + τ ct+1
Ac
c
]
βααχρ(1−α) (1− α)1−α lt+1
(
Ac
1 + τ ct+1
)α( Ax
1 + τxt+1
)1−α
= z
lzt
B
⇔
βαα (1− α)ρ(1−α)
(
Ax
1 + τxt+1
)ρ(1−α) [
lt+1 −
1 + τ ct+1
Ac
c
]ρ(1−α)
×
× (1− α)1−α lt+1
(
Ac
1 + τ ct+1
)α( Ax
1 + τxt+1
)1−α
= z
lzt
B
⇔
βαα (1− α)(1+ρ)(1−α)
(
Ax
1 + τxt+1
)(1+ρ)(1−α) [
lt+1 −
1 + τ ct+1
Ac
c
]ρ(1−α)
×
×lt+1
(
Ac
1 + τ ct+1
)α
= z
lzt
B
D Computing Income-Elasticities of Demand
As we shall see later, this step is very convenient. Picking up demands:
xt+1 =
1− α
pxt+1
(
1 + τxt+1
) [wtlt − pct+1 (1 + τ ct+1) c]⇔
xt+1 =
1− α
pxt+1
(
1 + τxt+1
) [mt+1 − pct+1 (1 + τ ct+1) c]
ct+1 =
α
pct+1
(
1 + τ ct+1
)mt+1 + (1− α) c
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ηct+1 ≡
∂ct+1
∂mt+1
mt+1
ct+1
=
α
pct+1
(
1 + τ ct+1
) mt+1α
pct+1(1+τct+1)
mt+1 + (1− α) c =
mt+1
mt+1 +
1−α
α p
c
t+1
(
1 + τ ct+1
)
c
=
mt+1
mt+1 +
1−α
α
mt+1
Aclt+1
(
1 + τ ct+1
)
c
=
1
1 + 1−αα
(1+τct+1)c
Aclt+1
=
lt+1
lt+1 +
1−α
α
(1+τct+1)c
Ac
ηxt+1 ≡
∂xt+1
∂mt+1
mt+1
xt+1
=
1− α
pxt+1
(
1 + τxt+1
) mt+1
1−α
pxt+1(1+τxt+1)
[
mt+1 − pct+1
(
1 + τ ct+1
)
c
] =
mt+1
mt+1 − pct+1
(
1 + τ ct+1
)
c
=
1
1− p
c
t+1
mt+1
(
1 + τ ct+1
)
c
=
1
1− 1Aclt+1
(
1 + τ ct+1
)
c
=
lt+1
lt+1 − (1+τ
c
t+1)c
Ac
E Log-linearized Model
Taking logs of the dynamic equation (14):
log
[
B
z
βαα (1− α)(1+ρ)(1−α)
(
Ax
1 + τxt+1
)(1+ρ)(1−α)( Ac
1 + τ ct+1
)α]
+
+ρ (1− α) log
[
lt+1 −
1 + τ ct+1
Ac
c
]
+ log lt+1 = z log lt
Differentiating this equation:
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ρ (1− α) dlt+1
lt+1 − 1+τ
c
t+1
Ac c
+
dlt+1
lt+1
=z
dlt
lt
⇔
ρ (1− α) dlt+1
lt+1 − 1+τ
c
t+1
Ac c
+ lˆt+1 =zlˆt ⇔
ρ (1− α)
dlt+1
lt+1
1
lt+1
[
lt+1 − 1+τ
c
t+1
Ac c
] + lˆt+1 =zlˆt ⇔
lˆt+1
ρ (1− α) 1
1− 1+τ
c
t+1
Aclt+1
c
+ 1
 =zlˆt ⇔
lˆt+1
[
ρ (1− α) lt+1
lt+1 − 1+τ
c
t+1
Ac c
+ 1
]
=zlˆt ⇔
lˆt+1
[
ρ (1− α) ηxt+1 + 1
]
=zlˆt ⇔
lˆt+1 =
z
1 + ρ (1− α) ηxt+1
lˆt
F Constant Tax Rate Policy or Absent Government
λ ≡ z
1 + ρ (1− α)
[
ηx − ϕx θx1+θx 1+ρρ + ϕc θ
c
1+θc
(
1− ηx − αρ(1−α)
)]
If there was a stationary government intervention or absent government, our eigenvalue
would become:
λ =
z
1 + ρ (1− α) ηx
which corresponds to the case where ϕc = ϕx = 0 or θc = θx = 0.
There will be indeterminacy if |λ| < 1, which means that the conditions which deter-
mine it to emerge depends on the signal of ρ.
1. If ρ > 0⇒ λ > 0. So λ < 1 iff 1 + ρ (1− α) ηx > z:
1 + ρ (1− α) ηx > z ⇔
ρ >
z − 1
(1− α) ηx
2. If ρ < 0 and ρ 6= − 1(1−α)ηx :
(a) 0 < λ < 1
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• λ > 0if:
1 + ρ (1− α) ηx > 0⇔
ρ > − 1
(1− α) ηx
• λ < 1if:
1 + ρ (1− α) ηx > z ⇔
ρ >
z − 1
(1− α) ηx
• So indeterminacy will not occur, because (z − 1) / (1− α) ηx > 0 and ρ < 0.
(b) −1 < λ < 0
• λ < 0if:
1 + ρ (1− α) ηx < 0⇔
ρ < − 1
(1− α) ηx
• λ > −1if:
1 + ρ (1− α) ηx < −z ⇔
ρ < − z + 1
(1− α) ηx
• So indeterminacy will occur when:
ρ < − 1
(1− α) ηx ∧ ρ < −
z + 1
(1− α) ηx ⇒
ρ < − z + 1
(1− α) ηx
ρ 6= − 1
(1− α)ηx
G Variable Fiscal Policy in the Absence of Externalities
λ ≡ z
1 + ρ (1− α)
[
ηx − ϕx θx1+θx 1+ρρ + ϕc θ
c
1+θc
(
1− ηx − αρ(1−α)
)]
If there was no externality, ρ = 0. Thus, the eigenvalue would turn into:
λ =
z
1− (1− α)ϕx θx1+θx − αϕc θ
c
1+θc
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We now show under which conditions variable fiscal policy can induce indeterminacy.
There will be indeterminacy if |λ| < 1. We will study the case of variable tax rate on
luxury goods separately from variable tax rate on the necessity good.
G.1 The case of ϕc = 0 and ϕx 6= 0
1. 0 < λ < 1
• Assuming z > 1, λ > 0 iff 1− (1− α)ϕx θx1+θx > 0:
1− (1− α)ϕx θ
x
1 + θx
> 0⇔
− (1− α)ϕx θ
x
1 + θx
> −1⇔
ϕx
θx
1 + θx
<
1
1− α
• And λ < 1 just iff 1− (1− α)ϕx θx1+θx > z:
1− (1− α)ϕx θ
x
1 + θx
> z ⇔
− (1− α)ϕx θ
x
1 + θx
> z − 1⇔
ϕx
θx
1 + θx
<
1− z
1− α < 0
• Thus, indeterminacy will require:
ϕx
θx
1 + θx
<
1
1− α ∧ ϕ
x θ
x
1 + θx
<
1− z
1− α ⇒
ϕx
θx
1 + θx
<
1− z
1− α < 0
2. −1 < λ < 0
• Assuming z > 1, λ < 0 iff 1− (1− α)ϕx θx1+θx < 0:
1− (1− α)ϕx θ
x
1 + θx
< 0⇔
− (1− α)ϕx θ
x
1 + θx
< −1⇔
ϕx
θx
1 + θx
>
1
1− α
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• And λ > −1 just iff 1− (1− α)ϕx θx1+θx − αϕc θ
c
1+θc < −z:
1− (1− α)ϕx θ
x
1 + θx
< −z ⇔
− (1− α)ϕx θ
x
1 + θx
< −z − 1⇔
ϕx
θx
1 + θx
>
1 + z
1− α > 0
• Thus, indeterminacy will require:
ϕx
θx
1 + θx
>
1
1− α ∧ ϕ
x θ
x
1 + θx
>
1 + z
1− α ⇒
ϕx
θx
1 + θx
>
1 + z
1− α > 0
Getting together these results, indeterminacy, i.e., |λ| < 1, requires: ϕx θx1+θx > 1+z1−α > 0,
i.e., a sufficiently strong pro-cyclical tax rate on luxury goods, or ϕx θ
x
1+θx <
1−z
1−α < 0, i.e.,
a sufficiently strong counter-cyclical tax rate.
G.2 The case of ϕc = 0 and ϕx 6= 0
1. 0 < λ < 1
• Assuming z > 1, λ > 0 iff 1− αϕc θc1+θc > 0:
1− αϕc θ
c
1 + θc
> 0⇔
ϕc
θc
1 + θc
<
1
α
• And λ < 1 just iff 1− αϕc θc1+θc > z:
1− αϕc θ
c
1 + θc
> z ⇔
0 > z − 1 + αϕc θ
c
1 + θc
⇔
ϕc
θc
1 + θc
<
1− z
α
< 0
• Thus, indeterminacy will require:
ϕc
θc
1 + θc
<
1
α
∧ ϕc θ
c
1 + θc
<
1− z
α
< 0⇒
ϕc
θc
1 + θc
<
1− z
α
< 0
2. −1 < λ < 0
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• Assuming z > 1, λ < 0 iff 1− αϕc θc1+θc < 0:
1− αϕc θ
c
1 + θc
< 0⇔
ϕc
θc
1 + θc
>
1
α
• And λ > −1 just iff 1− αϕc θc1+θc < −z:
1− αϕc θ
c
1 + θc
< −z ⇔
0 < −z − 1 + αϕc θ
c
1 + θc
⇔
ϕc
θc
1 + θc
>
1 + z
α
> 0
• Thus, indeterminacy will require:
ϕc
θc
1 + θc
>
1
α
∧ ϕc θ
c
1 + θc
>
1 + z
α
⇒
ϕc
θc
1 + θc
>
1 + z
α
> 0
Getting together these results, indeterminacy, i.e., |λ| < 1, requires: ϕc θc1+θc > 1+zα > 0,
i.e., a sufficiently strong pro-cyclical tax rate on luxury goods, orϕc θ
c
1+θc <
1−z
α < 0, i.e., a
sufficiently strong counter-cyclical tax rate.
H Variable tax rates policy
λ = λx ≡ z
1 + ρ (1− α)
[
ηx − ϕx θx1+θx 1+ρρ + ϕc θ
c
1+θc
(
1− ηx − αρ(1−α)
)]
H.1 The case of ϕc = 0 and ϕx 6= 0
λ = λx ≡ z
1 + ρ (1− α)
[
ηx − ϕx θx1+θx 1+ρρ
]
Indeterminacy requires |λx| < 1.
The case of ρ > 0
1. 0 < λx < 1
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• Assuming z > 1, λx > 0 iff 1 + ρ (1− α)
[
ηx − ϕx θx1+θx 1+ρρ
]
> 0:
1 + ρ (1− α)
[
ηx − ϕx θ
x
1 + θx
1 + ρ
ρ
]
> 0⇔
ηx − ϕx θ
x
1 + θx
1 + ρ
ρ
> − 1
ρ (1− α) ⇔
−ϕx θ
x
1 + θx
1 + ρ
ρ
> − 1
ρ (1− α) − η
x ⇔
ϕx
θx
1 + θx
1 + ρ
ρ
<
1
ρ (1− α) + η
x ⇔
ϕx
θx
1 + θx
<
ρ
1 + ρ
[
ηx +
1
ρ (1− α)
]
⇔
ϕx
θx
1 + θx
<
ρ
1 + ρ
ηx +
1
(1 + ρ) (1− α)
• Assuming z > 1, λx < 1 iff 1 + ρ (1− α)
[
ηx − ϕx θx1+θx 1+ρρ
]
> z:
1 + ρ (1− α)
[
ηx − ϕx θ
x
1 + θx
1 + ρ
ρ
]
> z ⇔
ηx − ϕx θ
x
1 + θx
1 + ρ
ρ
>
z − 1
ρ (1− α) ⇔
−ϕx θ
x
1 + θx
1 + ρ
ρ
>
z − 1
ρ (1− α) − η
x ⇔
ϕx
θx
1 + θx
1 + ρ
ρ
< ηx − z − 1
ρ (1− α) ⇔
ϕx
θx
1 + θx
<
ρ
1 + ρ
[
ηx − z − 1
ρ (1− α)
]
⇔
ϕx
θx
1 + θx
<
ρ
1 + ρ
ηx − z − 1
(1 + ρ) (1− α)
• So for indeterminacy to emerge:
ϕx
θx
1 + θx
<
ρ
1 + ρ
ηx − z − 1
(1 + ρ) (1− α) ∧
∧ ϕx θ
x
1 + θx
<
ρ
1 + ρ
ηx +
1
(1 + ρ) (1− α) ⇒
ϕx
θx
1 + θx
<
ρ
1 + ρ
ηx − z − 1
(1 + ρ) (1− α)
2. −1 < λx < 0
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• Assuming z > 1, λx < 0 iff 1 + ρ (1− α)
[
ηx − ϕx θx1+θx 1+ρρ
]
< 0:
1 + ρ (1− α)
[
ηx − ϕx θ
x
1 + θx
1 + ρ
ρ
]
< 0⇔
ηx − ϕx θ
x
1 + θx
1 + ρ
ρ
< − 1
ρ (1− α) ⇔
−ϕx θ
x
1 + θx
1 + ρ
ρ
< − 1
ρ (1− α) − η
x ⇔
ϕx
θx
1 + θx
1 + ρ
ρ
>
1
ρ (1− α) + η
x ⇔
ϕx
θx
1 + θx
>
ρ
1 + ρ
[
ηx +
1
ρ (1− α)
]
⇔
ϕx
θx
1 + θx
>
ρ
1 + ρ
ηx +
1
(1 + ρ) (1− α)
• Assuming z > 1, λx > −1⇔ −λ < 1 iff 1 + ρ (1− α)
[
ηx − ϕx θx1+θx 1+ρρ
]
< −z:
1 + ρ (1− α)
[
ηx − ϕx θ
x
1 + θx
1 + ρ
ρ
]
< −z ⇔
ηx − ϕx θ
x
1 + θx
1 + ρ
ρ
< − z + 1
ρ (1− α) ⇔
−ϕx θ
x
1 + θx
1 + ρ
ρ
< − z + 1
ρ (1− α) − η
x ⇔
ϕx
θx
1 + θx
1 + ρ
ρ
> ηx +
z + 1
ρ (1− α) ⇔
ϕx
θx
1 + θx
>
ρ
1 + ρ
[
ηx +
z + 1
ρ (1− α)
]
⇔
ϕx
θx
1 + θx
>
ρ
1 + ρ
ηx +
z + 1
(1 + ρ) (1− α)
• So indeterminacy requires:
ϕx
θx
1 + θx
>
ρ
1 + ρ
ηx +
1
(1 + ρ) (1− α) ∧
∧ ϕx θ
x
1 + θx
>
ρ
1 + ρ
ηx +
z + 1
(1 + ρ) (1− α) ⇒
ϕx
θx
1 + θx
>
ρ
1 + ρ
ηx +
z + 1
(1 + ρ) (1− α)
Getting together these results, eliminating indeterminacy, i.e., |λx| > 1, requires:
ρ
1 + ρ
ηx − z − 1
(1 + ρ) (1− α) < ϕ
x θ
x
1 + θx
<
ρ
1 + ρ
ηx +
z + 1
(1 + ρ) (1− α)
ϕx
θx
1 + θx
6= ρ
1 + ρ
ηx +
1
(1 + ρ) (1− α)
Notice that ρ1+ρη
x + z+1(1+ρ)(1−α) > 0 under our assumptions. However the signal of
ρ
1+ρη
x−
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z−1
(1+ρ)(1−α) is not clear. But if we take in account that, if there was no policy, indeterminacy
will just arise if ρ > z−1ηx(1−α) this implies
ρ
1+ρη
x − z−1(1+ρ)(1−α) > 0 and so a pro-cyclical tax
rate over luxury goods, i.e. ϕx > 0 is needed to rule out indeterminacy.
The case of ρ < 0 In fact, this case makes it necessary to consider three more detailed
cases: ρ = −1, ρ < −1 and ρ > −1, but we will limit our analysis to ρ > −1.
1. 0 < λx < 1
• Assuming z > 1, λ > 0 iff 1 + ρ (1− α)
[
ηx − ϕx θx1+θx 1+ρρ
]
> 0:
1 + ρ (1− α)
[
ηx − ϕx θ
x
1 + θx
1 + ρ
ρ
]
> 0⇔
ηx − ϕx θ
x
1 + θx
1 + ρ
ρ
< − 1
ρ (1− α) ⇔
−ϕx θ
x
1 + θx
1 + ρ
ρ
< − 1
ρ (1− α) − η
x ⇔
ϕx
θx
1 + θx
1 + ρ
ρ
>
1
ρ (1− α) + η
x ⇔
ϕx
θx
1 + θx
(1 + ρ) <
1
(1− α) + ρη
x
Now, if ρ > −1:
ϕx
θx
1 + θx
(1 + ρ) <
1
(1− α) + ρη
x ⇔
ϕx
θx
1 + θx
<
1
(1 + ρ) (1− α) +
ρ
1 + ρ
ηx
• Assuming z > 1, λ < 1 iff 1 + ρ (1− α)
[
ηx − ϕx θx1+θx 1+ρρ
]
> z:
1 + ρ (1− α)
[
ηx − ϕx θ
x
1 + θx
1 + ρ
ρ
]
> z ⇔
ηx − ϕx θ
x
1 + θx
1 + ρ
ρ
<
z − 1
ρ (1− α) ⇔
−ϕx θ
x
1 + θx
1 + ρ
ρ
<
z − 1
ρ (1− α) − η
x ⇔
ϕx
θx
1 + θx
1 + ρ
ρ
> ηx − z − 1
ρ (1− α)
If ρ > −1:
ϕx
θx
1 + θx
1 + ρ
ρ
> ηx − z − 1
ρ (1− α) ⇔
ϕx
θx
1 + θx
<
ρ
1 + ρ
ηx − z − 1
(1 + ρ) (1− α)
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• So, if ρ > −1, for indeterminacy to emerge we have:
ϕx
θx
1 + θx
<
ρ
1 + ρ
ηx +
1
(1 + ρ) (1− α) ∧
∧ ϕx θ
x
1 + θx
<
ρ
1 + ρ
ηx − z − 1
(1 + ρ) (1− α) ⇒
ϕx
θx
1 + θx
<
ρ
1 + ρ
ηx − z − 1
(1 + ρ) (1− α) < 0
2. −1 < λ < 0
• Assuming z > 1, λ < 0 iff 1 + ρ (1− α)
[
ηx − ϕx θx1+θx 1+ρρ
]
< 0:
1 + ρ (1− α)
[
ηx − ϕx θ
x
1 + θx
1 + ρ
ρ
]
< 0⇔
ηx − ϕx θ
x
1 + θx
1 + ρ
ρ
> − 1
ρ (1− α) ⇔
−ϕx θ
x
1 + θx
1 + ρ
ρ
> − 1
ρ (1− α) − η
x ⇔
ϕx
θx
1 + θx
1 + ρ
ρ
<
1
ρ (1− α) + η
x
If ρ > −1:
ϕx
θx
1 + θx
1 + ρ
ρ
<
1
ρ (1− α) + η
x ⇔
ϕx
θx
1 + θx
>
1
(1 + ρ) (1− α) +
ρ
1 + ρ
ηx ⇔
ϕx
θx
1 + θx
>
ρ
1 + ρ
ηx +
1
(1 + ρ) (1− α)
• Assuming z > 1, λ > −1⇔ −λ < 1 iff 1 + ρ (1− α)
[
ηx − ϕx θx1+θx 1+ρρ
]
< −z:
1 + ρ (1− α)
[
ηx − ϕx θ
x
1 + θx
1 + ρ
ρ
]
< −z ⇔
ηx − ϕx θ
x
1 + θx
1 + ρ
ρ
> − z + 1
ρ (1− α) ⇔
−ϕx θ
x
1 + θx
1 + ρ
ρ
> − z + 1
ρ (1− α) − η
x ⇔
ϕx
θx
1 + θx
1 + ρ
ρ
< ηx +
z + 1
ρ (1− α)
If ρ > −1:
ϕx
θx
1 + θx
1 + ρ
ρ
< ηx +
z + 1
ρ (1− α) ⇔
ϕx
θx
1 + θx
>
ρ
1 + ρ
ηx +
z + 1
(1 + ρ) (1− α)
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• So, if ρ > −1, indeterminacy requires:
ϕx
θx
1 + θx
>
ρ
1 + ρ
ηx +
1
(1 + ρ) (1− α) ∧
∧ ϕx θ
x
1 + θx
>
ρ
1 + ρ
ηx +
z + 1
(1 + ρ) (1− α) ⇒
ϕx
θx
1 + θx
>
ρ
1 + ρ
ηx +
z + 1
(1 + ρ) (1− α)
So combining these results, if ρ > −1, eliminating indeterminacy, i.e., |λx| > 1, requires:
ρ
1 + ρ
ηx − z − 1
(1 + ρ) (1− α) < ϕ
x θ
x
1 + θx
<
ρ
1 + ρ
ηx +
z + 1
(1 + ρ) (1− α)
ϕx
θx
1 + θx
6= ρ
1 + ρ
ηx +
1
(1 + ρ) (1− α)
In this case ρ1+ρη
x − z−1(1+ρ)(1−α) < 0. However, the signal of ρ1+ρηx + z+1(1+ρ)(1−α) is not
clear. Since indeterminacy will just arise if ρ < − z+1ηx(1−α) , in the absence of government
intervention, this implies ρ1+ρη
x − z−1(1+ρ)(1−α) < 0 and so a counter-cyclical tax rate over
luxury goods, i.e. ϕx < 0 is needed for stabilizing purposes.
H.2 The case of ϕx = 0 and ϕc 6= 0
λ = λc ≡ z
1 + ρ (1− α)
[
ηx + ϕc θ
c
1+θc
(
1− ηx − αρ(1−α)
)]
Indeterminacy requires |λc| < 1. Since ηx > 1, then this analysis will again depend on
the signal of ρ.
The case of ρ > 0
1. 0 < λc < 1
• Assuming z > 1, λc > 0 iff
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1 + ρ (1− α)
[
ηx + ϕc θ
c
1+θc
(
1− ηx − αρ(1−α)
)]
> 0:
1 + ρ (1− α)
[
ηx + ϕc
θc
1 + θc
(
1− ηx − α
ρ (1− α)
)]
> 0⇔
ηx + ϕc
θc
1 + θc
(
1− ηx − α
ρ (1− α)
)
> − 1
ρ (1− α) ⇔
ϕc
θc
1 + θc
(
1− ηx − α
ρ (1− α)
)
> − 1
ρ (1− α) − η
x ⇔
ϕc
θc
1 + θc
< −
1
ρ(1−α) + η
x
1− ηx − αρ(1−α)
⇔
ϕc
θc
1 + θc
<
1
ρ(1−α) + η
x
ηx + αρ(1−α) − 1
⇔
ϕc
θc
1 + θc
<
1+ηxρ(1−α)
ρ(1−α)
ηxρ(1−α)+α−ρ(1−α)
ρ(1−α)
⇔
ϕc
θc
1 + θc
<
ρ (1− α) ηx + 1
ρ (1− α) (ηx − 1) + α
• Assuming z > 1, λc < 1 iff
1 + ρ (1− α)
[
ηx + ϕc θ
c
1+θc
(
1− ηx − αρ(1−α)
)]
> z:
1 + ρ (1− α)
[
ηx + ϕc
θc
1 + θc
(
1− ηx − α
ρ (1− α)
)]
> z ⇔
ηx + ϕc
θc
1 + θc
(
1− ηx − α
ρ (1− α)
)
>
z − 1
ρ (1− α) ⇔
ϕc
θc
1 + θc
(
1− ηx − α
ρ (1− α)
)
>
z − 1
ρ (1− α) − η
x ⇔
ϕc
θc
1 + θc
<
z−1
ρ(1−α) − ηx
1− ηx − αρ(1−α)
⇔
ϕc
θc
1 + θc
<
z−1−ηxρ(1−α)
ρ(1−α)
(1−ηx)ρ(1−α)−α
ρ(1−α)
⇔
ϕc
θc
1 + θc
<
ρ (1− α) ηx + 1− z
(ηx − 1) ρ (1− α) + α
• So for indeterminacy to emerge:
ϕc
θc
1 + θc
<
ρ (1− α) ηx + 1
ρ (1− α) (ηx − 1) + α ∧
∧ ϕc θ
c
1 + θc
<
ρ (1− α) ηx + 1− z
(ηx − 1) ρ (1− α) + α ⇒
ϕc
θc
1 + θc
<
ρ (1− α) ηx + 1− z
(ηx − 1) ρ (1− α) + α
2. −1 < λx < 0
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• Assuming z > 1, λx < 0 iff
1 + ρ (1− α)
[
ηx + ϕc θ
c
1+θc
(
1− ηx − αρ(1−α)
)]
< 0:
1 + ρ (1− α)
[
ηx + ϕc
θc
1 + θc
(
1− ηx − α
ρ (1− α)
)]
< 0⇔
ηx + ϕc
θc
1 + θc
(
1− ηx − α
ρ (1− α)
)
< − 1
ρ (1− α) ⇔
ϕc
θc
1 + θc
(
1− ηx − α
ρ (1− α)
)
< − 1
ρ (1− α) − η
x ⇔
ϕc
θc
1 + θc
>
− 1ρ(1−α) − ηx
1− ηx − αρ(1−α)
⇔
ϕc
θc
1 + θc
> −
1
ρ(1−α) + η
x
1− ηx − αρ(1−α)
⇔
ϕc
θc
1 + θc
> −
1+ρ(1−α)ηx
ρ(1−α)
ρ(1−α)(1−ηx)−α
ρ(1−α)
⇔
ϕc
θc
1 + θc
>
ρ (1− α) ηx + 1
ρ (1− α) (ηx − 1) + α
• Assuming z > 1, λx > −1⇔ −λ < 1 iff
1 + ρ (1− α)
[
ηx + ϕc θ
c
1+θc
(
1− ηx − αρ(1−α)
)]
< −z:
1 + ρ (1− α)
[
ηx + ϕc
θc
1 + θc
(
1− ηx − α
ρ (1− α)
)]
< −z ⇔
ηx + ϕc
θc
1 + θc
(
1− ηx − α
ρ (1− α)
)
< − z + 1
ρ (1− α) ⇔
ϕc
θc
1 + θc
(
1− ηx − α
ρ (1− α)
)
< − z + 1
ρ (1− α) − η
x ⇔
ϕc
θc
1 + θc
> −
z+1
ρ(1−α) + η
x
1− ηx − αρ(1−α)
⇔
ϕc
θc
1 + θc
> −
z+1+ρ(1−α)ηx
ρ(1−α)
ρ(1−α)(1−ηx)−α
ρ(1−α)
⇔
ϕc
θc
1 + θc
>
ρ (1− α) ηx + 1 + z
ρ (1− α) (ηx − 1) + α
• So indeterminacy requires:
ϕc
θc
1 + θc
>
ρ (1− α) ηx + 1
ρ (1− α) (ηx − 1) + α ∧
∧ ϕc θ
c
1 + θc
>
ρ (1− α) ηx + 1 + z
ρ (1− α) (ηx − 1) + α ⇒
ϕc
θc
1 + θc
>
ρ (1− α) ηx + 1 + z
ρ (1− α) (ηx − 1) + α
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Getting together these results, eliminating indeterminacy, i.e., |λc| > 1, requires:
ρ (1− α) ηx + 1− z
(ηx − 1) ρ (1− α) + α < ϕ
c θ
c
1 + θc
<
ρ (1− α) ηx + 1 + z
ρ (1− α) (ηx − 1) + α
ϕc
θc
1 + θc
6= ρ (1− α) η
x + 1
ρ (1− α) (ηx − 1) + α
Notice that ρ(1−α)η
x+1+z
ρ(1−α)(ηx−1)+α > 0 under our assumptions. However
ρ(1−α)ηx+1−z
(ηx−1)ρ(1−α)+α ≷ 0. But if
we take in account that, if there was no policy, indeterminacy will just arise if ρ > z−1ηx(1−α)
this implies ρ(1−α)η
x+1−z
(ηx−1)ρ(1−α)+α > 0 and so a pro-cyclical tax rate over necessity goods, i.e.
ϕc > 0 is needed to rule out indeterminacy.
The case of ρ < 0 We shall consider only the case of ρ > α(1−ηx)(1−α) .
1. 0 < λc < 1
• Assuming z > 1, λc > 0 iff 1 + ρ (1− α)
[
ηx + ϕc θ
c
1+θc
(
1− ηx − αρ(1−α)
)]
> 0:
1 + ρ (1− α)
[
ηx + ϕc
θc
1 + θc
(
1− ηx − α
ρ (1− α)
)]
> 0⇔
ηx + ϕc
θc
1 + θc
(
1− ηx − α
ρ (1− α)
)
< − 1
ρ (1− α) ⇔
ϕc
θc
1 + θc
(
1− ηx − α
ρ (1− α)
)
< − 1
ρ (1− α) − η
x
If ρ > α(1−ηx)(1−α) ⇒ 1− ηx − αρ(1−α) > 0:
ϕc
θc
1 + θc
(
1− ηx − α
ρ (1− α)
)
< − 1
ρ (1− α) − η
x ⇔
ϕc
θc
1 + θc
< −
1
ρ(1−α) + η
x
1− ηx − αρ(1−α)
⇔
ϕc
θc
1 + θc
< −
1+ρ(1−α)ηx
ρ(1−α)
ρ(1−α)(1−ηx)−α
ρ(1−α)
⇔
ϕc
θc
1 + θc
<
ρ (1− α) ηx + 1
ρ (1− α) (ηx − 1) + α
• Assuming z > 1, λ < 1 iff
1 + ρ (1− α)
[
ηx + ϕc θ
c
1+θc
(
1− ηx − αρ(1−α)
)]
> z:
1 + ρ (1− α)
[
ηx + ϕc
θc
1 + θc
(
1− ηx − α
ρ (1− α)
)]
> z ⇔
ηx + ϕc
θc
1 + θc
(
1− ηx − α
ρ (1− α)
)
<
z − 1
ρ (1− α) ⇔
ϕc
θc
1 + θc
(
1− ηx − α
ρ (1− α)
)
<
z − 1
ρ (1− α) − η
x
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If ρ > α(1−ηx)(1−α) ⇒ 1− ηx − αρ(1−α) > 0:
ϕc
θc
1 + θc
(
1− ηx − α
ρ (1− α)
)
<
z − 1
ρ (1− α) − η
x ⇔
ϕc
θc
1 + θc
<
z−1
ρ(1−α) − ηx
1− ηx − αρ(1−α)
⇔
ϕc
θc
1 + θc
<
z−1−ρ(1−α)ηx
ρ(1−α)
ρ(1−α)(1−ηx)−α
ρ(1−α)
⇔
ϕc
θc
1 + θc
<
ρ (1− α) ηx + 1− z
ρ (1− α) (ηx − 1) + α
• So, f ρ > α(1−ηx)(1−α) ⇒ ρ (1− α) (ηx − 1)+α > 0, for indeterminacy to emerge:
ϕc
θc
1 + θc
<
ρ (1− α) ηx + 1
ρ (1− α) (ηx − 1) + α ∧
∧ ϕc θ
c
1 + θc
<
ρ (1− α) ηx + 1− z
ρ (1− α) (ηx − 1) + α ⇒
ϕc
θc
1 + θc
<
ρ (1− α) ηx + 1− z
ρ (1− α) (ηx − 1) + α
2. −1 < λ < 0
• Assuming z > 1, λc < 0 iff
1 + ρ (1− α)
[
ηx + ϕc θ
c
1+θc
(
1− ηx − αρ(1−α)
)]
< 0:
1 + ρ (1− α)
[
ηx + ϕc
θc
1 + θc
(
1− ηx − α
ρ (1− α)
)]
< 0⇔
ηx + ϕc
θc
1 + θc
(
1− ηx − α
ρ (1− α)
)
> − 1
ρ (1− α) ⇔
ϕc
θc
1 + θc
(
1− ηx − α
ρ (1− α)
)
> − 1
ρ (1− α) − η
x
If ρ > α(1−ηx)(1−α) ⇒ 1− ηx − αρ(1−α) > 0:
ϕc
θc
1 + θc
(
1− ηx − α
ρ (1− α)
)
> − 1
ρ (1− α) − η
x ⇔
ϕc
θc
1 + θc
> −
1
ρ(1−α) + η
x
1− ηx − αρ(1−α)
⇔
ϕc
θc
1 + θc
> −
1+ρ(1−α)ηx
ρ(1−α)
ρ(1−α)(1−ηx)−α
ρ(1−α)
⇔
ϕc
θc
1 + θc
>
ρ (1− α) ηx + 1
ρ (1− α) (ηx − 1) + α
• Assuming z > 1, λ > −1⇔ −λ < 1 iff
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1 + ρ (1− α)
[
ηx + ϕc θ
c
1+θc
(
1− ηx − αρ(1−α)
)]
< −z:
1 + ρ (1− α)
[
ηx + ϕc
θc
1 + θc
(
1− ηx − α
ρ (1− α)
)]
< −z ⇔
ηx + ϕc
θc
1 + θc
(
1− ηx − α
ρ (1− α)
)
> − z + 1
ρ (1− α) ⇔
ϕc
θc
1 + θc
(
1− ηx − α
ρ (1− α)
)
> − z + 1
ρ (1− α) − η
x
If ρ > α(1−ηx)(1−α) ⇒ 1− ηx − αρ(1−α) > 0:
ϕc
θc
1 + θc
(
1− ηx − α
ρ (1− α)
)
> − z + 1
ρ (1− α) − η
x ⇔
ϕc
θc
1 + θc
> −
z+1
ρ(1−α) + η
x
1− ηx − αρ(1−α)
⇔
ϕc
θc
1 + θc
> −
z+1+ρ(1−α)ηx
ρ(1−α)
ρ(1−α)(1−ηx)−α
ρ(1−α)
⇔
ϕc
θc
1 + θc
>
ρ (1− α) ηx + 1 + z
ρ (1− α) (ηx − 1) + α
• So, if ρ > α(1−ηx)(1−α) ⇒ ρ (1− α) (ηx − 1) + α > 0, indeterminacy requires:
ϕc
θc
1 + θc
>
ρ (1− α) ηx + 1
ρ (1− α) (ηx − 1) + α ∧
∧ ϕc θ
c
1 + θc
>
ρ (1− α) ηx + 1 + z
ρ (1− α) (ηx − 1) + α ⇒
ϕc
θc
1 + θc
>
ρ (1− α) ηx + 1 + z
ρ (1− α) (ηx − 1) + α
Combining these results, if ρ > α(1−ηx)(1−α) ⇒ ρ (1− α) (ηx − 1) + α > 0, eliminating
indeterminacy, i.e., |λc| > 1, requires:
ρ (1− α) ηx + 1− z
ρ (1− α) (ηx − 1) + α < ϕ
c θ
c
1 + θc
<
ρ (1− α) ηx + 1 + z
ρ (1− α) (ηx − 1) + α
ϕc
θc
1 + θc
6= ρ (1− α) η
x + 1
ρ (1− α) (ηx − 1) + α
In this case ρ(1−α)η
x+1−z
ρ(1−α)(ηx−1)+α < 0. However, the signal of
ρ(1−α)ηx+1+z
ρ(1−α)(ηx−1)+α is not clear. Since
indeterminacy will just arise if ρ < − z+1ηx(1−α) , in the absence of government intervention,
this implies ρ(1−α)η
x+1+z
ρ(1−α)(ηx−1)+α < 0 and so a counter-cyclical tax rate over necessity goods, i.e.
ϕc < 0 is needed for stabilizing purposes.
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